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Last summer’s war in Georgia brought into sharp focus several key components of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War period, and raised major questions about 
the future of U.S. relations with Russia, Geor-
gia and most of the former Soviet region. The 
war was also a wake-up call (to those who may 
somehow have still been asleep): The post-Cold 
War period—a time marked by a prostrate Rus-
sia and virtually unchecked American power in 
the region—is over. In this new post-post-Cold 
War period, the challenge for U.S. policymak-
ers is to craft a strategy that recognizes both the 
potential danger Russia poses to its neighbors 
and the limits to U.S. influence in the region—
limits that have only grown tighter thanks to 
the ongoing global economic crisis.
The war has already forced the United States 
to take a more critical look at its relationships 
with both Georgia and Russia. That task fell to a 
Bush Administration as it was coming to an end. 
But the war also forces us to situate those chal-
lenges in the context of a triangular relationship 
between Russia, the United States and Europe, 
because the United States cannot formulate an 
effective policy toward Russia without the sup-
port of the Europeans. This task falls to the 
Obama Administration as it is just beginning. 
Re-examining our relations with both Russia 
and Georgia in light of Europe will be a compli-
cated undertaking, not least because of the di-
verse views toward Russia within the European 
Union. In general, the East European countries 
are far more concerned about an imperial Rus-
sia, while the West European countries are more 
concerned about maintaining economic and 
other ties with Russia, lest conflict push the Eu-
ropean experiment beyond its breaking point. 
These differences are highlighted whenever 
the word “Georgia” is spoken within European 
Union council chambers. Many East European 
elites believe that NATO membership for Geor-
gia (as well as Ukraine) should be fast-tracked; 
any other course of action would seem to reward 
Russian aggression and devalue NATO’s repu-
tation. But most West European elites believe 
that this is the very last thing we should do, lest 
it catalyze another war over Georgia, something 
that couldn’t possibly end well. 
If the European Union lacks a coherent Rus-
sia policy, Washington will be as hard-pressed as 
ever to give it one. We cannot “get tough” with 
Russia without a European partner, yet a failure 
to challenge Russia’s imperial appetites could 
lead to disasters down the road. In such a situa-
tion, wise policy avoids forcing the issue in either 
of two dangerous directions. That is where U.S. 
policy was—precariously nestled in the bosom of 
useful ambiguity—before the summer war. And 
that is where the Obama Administration should 
return it to, if it can. Certainly, it should do noth-
ing to force equally unpleasant choices upon itself 
over Ukraine or other potential flashpoints along 




Lincoln A. Mitchell is Arnold A. Saltzman Assis-
tant Professor of International Politics at Columbia 
University’s School of International and Public Af-
fairs. He has written extensively on Georgia and is 
the author of Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign 
Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
66 The american inTereST
The Russia PoRTfolio
To avoid such self-inflicted crises, the Obama 
Administration must learn from the mistakes of 
its predecessor. The United States got way too 
far out on its skis in its support for Georgia, and 
for its mercurial and accident-prone leader. The 
Bush Administration took risks it seemed un-
aware of, and, when war came, it was reduced 
to mostly feckless posturing. It did manage to 
avoid a broader conflict, but the whole affair 
was not a pretty sight. We should not let such a 
thing happen again.
Origins of the War
Avoiding a repeat of past mistakes requires understanding the origins of the Russo-
Georgian war, but, not for first time, what one 
sees depends on when one starts looking. If we 
focus on the events of the spring and summer of 
2008, we can argue over whether Russia plotted 
the war and trapped the Georgian leadership, 
or whether the Georgian leadership made an 
ill-considered decision to start shooting, hand-
ing Russia a pretext for retaliation. If we were 
to focus on the 2003 Rose Revolution, which 
brought President Mikheil Saakashvili to pow-
er, we would stress the importance of Russia’s 
long-standing attempts to weaken and destabi-
lize Georgia, Saakashvili’s efforts to move his 
country closer to the United States, and the do-
mestic Georgian political considerations push-
ing him to war. If we were to start our history 
in the early 1990s, we would understand how 
Georgia became fragmented territorially in the 
immediate post-Communist period by the na-
tionalist government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
Georgia’s first post-Soviet leader. And if we go 
back to the Bolshevik Revolution and its imme-
diate aftermath, we would see how the special 
status given to Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 
the Soviet leadership in the 1920s destined any 
future Georgian state to be dogged by issues of 
territorial integrity. 
The truth is that all of these points of entry 
matter, and have something to teach us. Georgia 
had been part of the Russian Empire since the 
early 19th century, but from 1918 to 1921, Geor-
gia was, for the first time in centuries, an inde-
pendent state, and during those few years it did 
include South Ossetia and Abkhazia (although 
Abkhazia was not entirely consolidated into the 
state). The tiny republic was no match for the So-
viet Union, however, and when the Soviet Union 
incorporated Georgia, Stalin, first as Commis-
sioner for Nationalities in the USSR and later 
as the General Secretary of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party, granted South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
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among other things, the nominal right to secede 
from Georgia. (Of course, everybody knows that 
Stalin was Georgian; but a lot of Georgians in-
sist he was really Ossetian.) This right, which 
was highly theoretical at the time, turned out to 
be a geopolitical time bomb, for it was exercised 
shortly after Georgia became independent once 
again in 1991. When it was exercised, the first 
post-independence Georgian government reacted 
in a way that exacerbated the division, employ-
ing an all-sticks, no-carrots rhetoric that it could 
not back up with effective action. Thereafter, 
the Russian government endeavored to keep the 
breach open in order to use the Ossetians and 
Abkhazians to gain leverage against Georgia. 
It’s a fair guess that the senior members of 
the Bush Administration knew little about 
these historical threads, even the post-Cold 
War ones, when they committed American 
prestige and reputation to the Saakashvili gov-
ernment and the restoration of Georgia’s terri-
torial integrity. (They knew little of the history 
of Afghanistan or Iraq, either; knowledge-free 
zones are part and parcel of an ideologically 
driven foreign policy.) This and other mistakes 
yet to be mentioned left them unprepared for 
what happened last August 7–8.
The initial, still widely accepted view of the 
war’s proximate origin is that Saakashvili was 
provoked one too many times by Russia and so 
decided that something had to be done about it. 
He then sent the Georgian military into South 
Ossetia, which gave Russia the excuse it had been 
looking for to attack the entire country, devastate 
its military and visibly re-assert Russian power in 
the region. The Georgians, not surprisingly, take 
a different view. The official position, which is 
shared by most Georgian citizens (due in no 
small part to government dominance of the 
media), is essentially that Russia began attack-
ing Georgia early in the day on August 7 and 
that Georgia retaliated in self-defense. Alas, the 
Georgians have been unable to persuade many 
outsiders that this was in fact the case. Lately, 
more Georgians are also raising questions about 
the decisions their leaders made. 
This growing chorus of questions amounts 
to a serious problem for the Saakashvili govern-
ment. Major political and civil society figures 
outside of the government, most notably for-
mer Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze 
and former Georgian Ambassador to the 
United Nations Irakli Alasania have called for 
investigations into the origins of the war. If it 
can be shown that Saakashvili bears substan-
tial responsibility for starting it, his already 
embattled regime will be further weakened—
precisely what Saakashvili’s detractors hope for. 
The perception that Georgia was responsible 
for the initial escalation hurts Georgia in the 
international context as well. While European 
and American governments agree that Russia’s 
actions were reprehensible and showed signs 
of ambitions that go far beyond Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, the question of whether Geor-
gia fired the first shot speaks to both the judg-
ment of its leadership and its reliability as an 
ally. Even those willing to contemplate Georgia 
in NATO might be daunted by evidence that 
the Georgian leadership is impulsive and im-
prudent.
There is a difference, however, between 
Saakashvili’s methods, which may have been ill-
considered, and his strategy, which arose from 
the logic of circumstances. The frozen con-
flicts provided context and, perhaps, pretext for 
Russian actions, but clearly the real stake was 
Georgia’s orientation toward the world. Since 
Saakashvili came to power in January 2004, 
after helping to lead a protest movement that 
swept former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze from power, his main aim has 
been to build an independent and democratic 
country aligned with the West. That is what ir-
ritated the Kremlin, which has preferred that 
Georgia remain a failing state that depends on 
Russia economically and politically—the Ar-
menian model, one might call it. 
Moscow made itself crystal clear. Before last 
summer’s war, Russia had flown planes over 
Georgian airspace and even dropped explosives 
onto Georgian territory. The Georgian econo-
my suffered from a Russian boycott of Georgian 
wine and mineral water, justified by the bizarre 
assertion that these products were tainted and 
dangerous. Russia has also become involved in 
Georgian domestic politics (although not to the 
extent occasionally suggested by the Georgian 
government) in a way that has generally been 
destructive for Georgia. The war was never 
simply about Abkhazia and South Ossetia; nor, 
therefore, is the aftermath. 
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That is why, regardless of what happens in the 
frozen conflicts, the United States cannot throw 
Georgia to the Russian wolves. That would not 
only wreak havoc on Georgia; it would also set a 
dangerous precedent for many other states in the 
roiling post-Soviet space. Besides, even if it were 
possible to abandon the Georgian mess through, 
say, a cold-blooded realpolitik exchange for Rus-
sian cooperation over Iran or Afghanistan one 
simply cannot secure reliable guarantees from 
a Russia increasingly racked by economic cri-
sis and instability. The Obama Administration 
should not trade on the Georgian portfolio even 
if it can suppress its conscience long enough to 
do the deal.
The U.S. Role
For what it’s worth, giving up on Georgia would be morally objectionable for yet an-
other reason: U.S. policymakers helped cause 
the war by mishandling U.S. relationships with 
both Russia and Georgia.
Russia’s aggression against Georgia clarifies 
the fact that Russia is a would-be regional hege-
mon whose goals frequently conflict with those 
of the United States. It is hard to believe that any-
body who thought much about Russia could have 
been unaware of this by the summer of 2008; 
yet U.S. policy proceeded as though its embrace 
of the Georgian and Ukrainian “Color Revolu-
tions” had no significant effect on Russian as-
sessments and potential behavior. U.S. efforts to 
expand democracy and NATO into the former 
Soviet space were not necessarily wrongheaded, 
but they were almost guaranteed to create prob-
lems in U.S.-Russia relations. To have been blind 
to this fact was to invite a nasty surprise. 
This is not solely a matter of balancing inter-
ests; there’s a psychological dynamic at work as 
well. The way the United States treats Russia’s 
interests is almost as important to Russia as the 
interests themselves. Russian frustration with 
the United States has been driven by U.S. style 
as well as substance. A case in point is the U.S. 
decision to support and later to recognize Ko-
sovo’s independence in February 2008, and it is 
a point very likely related to the Georgian war.
U.S. policy on Kosovo, whatever its merits, 
was bound to exacerbate Russian resentment 
toward U.S. foreign policy as a whole. From the 
start of the Kosovo War onward, the United 
States pursued a policy that Russia opposed on 
specific political grounds and on more general 
grounds as well. Here was the West yet again 
attacking Serbia, Russia’s oldest Slavic ally. And 
here was the West saying that ethnic criteria 
provided sufficient justification to dismember 
a state in the name of self-determination, even 
without the explicit consent of the United Na-
tions Security Council. The Russian govern-
ment said plainly that if the West proceeded 
with this breach of traditional restraint on be-
half of its own interests, Russia would feel free 
to do the same, specifically pointing to Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia as examples.
There are good reasons why Kosovo is not 
comparable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
but Moscow genuinely saw them as parallel 
situations. Russia began acting accordingly af-
ter February 2008 by strengthening its ties with 
the Abkhazian and Ossestian leaderships in 
Sukhumi and Tsinkhvali. That American diplo-
mats expressed surprise at Russian opposition to 
U.S. Kosovo policy, treating it as merely a tacti-
cal feint that could be propitiated with the right 
phraseology, outraged the Russians. They saw in 
that response proof that the Americans had not 
even been listening to what they were saying. 
Unfortunately, they had a point. U.S. policy 
in recent years has overstated both the weak-
ness and the good intentions of Russia, but 
above all, perhaps, it has overlooked its rel-
evance. The Bush Administration was reason-
ably subtle when it came to understanding the 
price it would have to pay for publicly criticizing 
Russia’s increasingly anti-liberal inclinations; it 
resisted domestic pressure to push Moscow on 
this issue, knowing that it would not help to 
secure Russian cooperation with regard to Iran, 
for example. But it never seemed to understand 
how its boastful embrace of the Color Revolu-
tions or its vigor to expand NATO and support 
democracy assistance in the region would exact 
a similar cost. That’s apparently not an insight 
George W. Bush got from looking into Vladi-
mir Putin’s soul.
The U.S. role in the war must also be un-derstood in the context of policy toward 
Georgia. The United States did not start the 
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war, nor did it encourage Georgia to start it—
notwithstanding the ludicrous and somewhat 
frightening claim by Putin himself that the 
Bush White House sought to whip up anti-
Russian hysteria to help elect John McCain to 
the presidency. Nonetheless, during the years 
preceding August 2008, the United States acted 
in ways that emboldened the Georgian leader-
ship and led it to behave impulsively. Indeed, it 
acted in ways that led the Georgian government 
to feel confident that the United States would 
support it in the event of war. 
U.S. policy toward Georgia from the Rose 
Revolution to the end of the Bush Adminis-
tration suffered from an inability, or perhaps 
unwillingness, to accurately understand Geor-
gian politics. It was dominated by an increas-
ingly personalized relationship between the 
two sides. Saakashvili and other leaders of the 
Rose Revolution, most notably Saakashvili’s 
first Prime Minister, Zurab Zhvania, had spent 
years building relationships throughout the 
U.S. foreign policy leadership. When Saakash-
vili finally came to power, he had well-wishers 
throughout Washington at all levels of govern-
ment who helped the new government secure 
both financial backing and the confidence of 
the U.S. government.
These personal relationships led to an exces-
sively rosy U.S. view of Georgian reality. The 
American side tended to treat Georgia as an un-
equivocal success story and a thriving democra-
cy, and tended to see the Rose Revolution, which 
was obviously only a part of a process, as the en-
tire process of democratization itself. The U.S. 
Ambassador during most of this time, a Foreign 
Service Officer named John Tefft, had a clearer 
understanding of Georgian realities and of the 
sometimes perilous course its leadership chose, 
but his impact on decision-makers in Washing-
ton was limited. Despite his warnings, the U.S. 
government became incapable of any public 
disagreement with the Georgian government. 
The frozen conflicts were dominated by Geor-
gia’s focus on its own territorial integrity rather 
than on U.S. efforts to solve existing problems. 
And as the Georgian government moved more 
clearly away from its democratic promise, offi-
cial Washington either explained away or simply 
ignored the problems. Thus, after Saakashvili 
violently dispersed peaceful demonstrators in 
November 2007, it was not uncommon to hear 
people in Washington say, referring to Saakash-
vili by his nickname, “Misha had a bad week, 
but he’s okay now.” This sentiment only grew 
stronger after a snap election in January 2008, 
in which Saakashvili narrowly avoided a runoff 
in part through the liberal use of “administra-
tive resources” by the government.
Over time, Saakashvili developed an unusu-
ally strong relationship with President Bush, as 
well as with many people close to Vice Presi-
dent Dick Cheney. This relationship allowed 
Saakashvili to have direct access to the President 
and Vice President, making it even more diffi-
cult for the few members of the Administration 
who were critical or concerned about develop-
ments in Georgia to be heard. The development 
of direct channels skirting the conventional 
structures between the leaders of the two gov-
ernments was particularly important during the 
spring and summer of 2008. The personaliza-
tion of relationships meant that perceptions of 
Saakashvili—rather than, say, the U.S. national 
interest—played a major role in how Georgia 
was viewed in the United States and elsewhere. 
It’s not hard to see how this situation devel-
oped. Saakashvili is an extraordinary personal-
ity who makes an extraordinary impression. He 
is relatively young, only 41 years old, extremely 
energetic, smart and witty—the kind of person 
who brightens a room when he walks in. He 
spent time in Washington and New York as a 
law student, is married to a Dutch woman and 
is famous for being able to speak many Euro-
pean languages. It is not unusual to see him 
switch effortlessly from Georgian to French to 
English to Ukrainian in the course of a single 
press conference. Although Georgia sees itself 
as European, Saakashvili himself seems more 
American than anything else, and more a New 
Yorker than an American. 
Ironically, the Bush Administration’s will-
ingness to accept Saakashvili as a Georgian 
George Washington wound up harming Geor-
gian democracy. Shortly after the Rose Revolu-
tion, U.S. support in Georgia shifted away from 
democratic development in areas such as media, 
political parties and civil society and toward 
strengthening the state. The reason? Against 
nearly all available evidence on the history of 
democratization, the United States increasingly 
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viewed the government as the chief engine of 
democratization in Georgia. But as so often 
happened during George W. Bush’s tenure, re-
ality pulled trump. Before he was even sworn in 
as President, Saakashvili pushed through a se-
ries of constitutional reforms giving more pow-
er to the presidency at the expense of the legisla-
ture. During the next three years, democracy in 
Georgia could have charitably been described 
as simply not a priority to the new Georgian 
government, which was intent on rooting out 
corruption, reforming the education system, 
retraining police, reducing bureaucracy and 
strengthening the state. In concrete terms, this 
meant less media freedom, no independent ju-
diciary, and weakening opposition parties in 
order to produce Georgia’s fourth one-party 
system in less than twenty years. 
It was still possible during this time to see 
the positives as outweighing the negatives: 
Rampant corruption, for example, truly was 
weakening Georgians’ faith in democracy, so it 
made sense to go after it even if it did strength-
en the state at the expense of civil society. These 
things are not simple. The United States, how-
ever, simply didn’t see any negatives or recognize 
any tradeoffs. In contrast, European views of 
Georgian democracy were grounded in a more 
realistic understanding and grew considerably 
more negative after November 2007. These dif-
ferences emerged during the war, when U.S. 
and European statements often diverged in 
tone, if not always in substance.
The Historical Context
In fairness, Georgia’s democracy record must be seen in a broader political and social con-
text. Although Georgia is an ancient nation, its 
history as an independent state is brief. Before 
1991, Georgia had been independent for only 
three years of the preceding two centuries. 
Georgia’s development in this context created 
major obstacles to becoming a functioning 
democratic state. For example, stealing from 
the central government when you are unhap-
pily under somebody else’s rule can be rational-
ized as an act of rebellion and patriotism. But 
after two centuries of institutional corruption, 
it’s hard to see stealing from the central govern-
ment in an independent state as the destructive 
and unpatriotic act it is. 
Moreover, the first 14 years of Georgia’s 
post-Soviet independence did not move Geor-
gia toward becoming a functioning state or 
democracy. Two very different governments 
oversaw periods of widespread corruption, col-
lapsing economies and the loss of almost a third 
of Georgia’s territory. By the time Saakashvili 
became President, Georgia was an increasingly 
weak and divided state, wracked by poverty and 
a left with a civil society that consisted essen-
tially of a tiny handful of well-known NGOs.
This was clear to anybody who spent time in 
Georgia during the Shevardnadze period. Sub-
stantial areas of the country, such as Svaneti and 
Samagrelo, were largely controlled by gangsters. 
Collective action was nearly impossible. Individ-
uals sought personal or family solutions to every 
problem. Regular electric service was unheard 
of, so every family and business that could af-
ford one bought a generator, making the air on 
the main streets extremely difficult to breathe. 
As roads fell into disrepair, the only hope for fix-
ing them was to have a millionaire move in next 
door and take on the job as a private project. (A 
representative of the local government of Tbilisi 
offered to fix the road to my house once after 
dropping me off at home, but I declined. I knew, 
in the end, that it would not be worth it.)
Apartment buildings in Tbilisi generally did 
not have front doors. They had been stolen and 
either sold as scrap metal or burned for fuel. But 
despite the obvious drawbacks of not having a 
front door, the enduring Soviet legacy of mis-
trust between citizens meant that it was almost 
unheard of for the tenants to join together and 
split the cost of a replacement. Instead, people 
just invested, if they could, in good locks and 
thick doors for their own apartments and hoped 
for the best.
The Bush Administration never appeared to 
appreciate the scale of the challenge Saakash-
vili faced in attempting to build both state and 
democracy. Anybody surveying the civil and 
political climate in Georgia during the late She-
vardnadze period could not have realistically 
expected Georgia to become a democracy in a 
matter of a few years. But the Bush Administra-
tion seemed to expect precisely that.
The gist of all this is that U.S. policy was 
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multi-dimensionally distorted as the summer of 
2008 approached. It saw democracy where there 
was none. It saw a heroic leader where there was 
only a fallible mortal in a tough spot. It became 
generically uncritical of Georgian policies and 
perspectives. It did not listen to its own experts, 
instead substituting the false confidence borne 
of personal relationships. Taken together, this 
meant that the U.S. government, while warning 
against military solutions, never raised concerns 
about the wisdom and realism of the Georgian 
cause itself in the context of overheating rheto-
ric. Thus it is not surprising that Georgia did 
not take U.S. warnings about using its military 
in South Ossetia or Abkhazia very seriously.
The personalized nature of the U.S.-Geor-
gia relationship, in particular, made it too easy 
for Georgia to ignore official U.S. warnings. Al-
though the State Department had never issued 
a meaningful public criticism of Saakashvili’s 
government, State officials were wise enough to 
understand that a Georgian offensive in either 
South Ossetia or Abkhazia would not end well 
for Georgia or the United States. So Secretary 
Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary Dan 
Fried and others privately urged the Georgian 
government not to take such a step. These warn-
ings, however, were never going to be enough. 
The Saakashvili government’s direct relations 
with Vice President Cheney’s office, in particu-
lar, meant that if they did not like what they 
heard from the State Department, they could 
go somewhere else for a more pleasing opinion. 
To some extent, too, Saakashvili’s decision 
to ignore official warnings from the U.S. gov-
ernment and seek approval from other channels 
can be seen as part of a decision to transfer his 
primary relationship from Bush to Senator John 
McCain. Saakashvili’s relationship with McCa-
in was close. McCain had visited Georgia, where 
the President took him sightseeing and fishing 
in Georgia’s beautiful mountainous country-
side. Moreover, they had an important common 
friend in Randy Scheunemann, who served as 
the top foreign policy advisor to the Republican 
nominee and previously as a key Washington 
lobbyist for Saakashvili’s government. 
This turned out to be wishful thinking on 
two counts. Not only did McCain lose the elec-
tion, but once the war began Bush did not act 
as aggressively as Saakashvili had hoped. The 
postwar assistance package to Georgia, while 
extraordinary generous, was not the same as an 
offer of concrete support to Georgia while Rus-
sian tanks plunged deep into Georgian territory. 
The young President, after all, had been compar-
ing the conflict to Soviet-era acts of international 
aggression against Finland, Hungary and other 
countries. (If Saakashvili had been a better histo-
rian, he would have known that the West did not 
intervene militarily against the Russians in these 
cases, either.)
It is true, of course, that the United States was 
overextended militarily at the time, mainly in 
Iraq. Saakashvili knew that, which explains the 
relatively large Georgian military deployment 
to Iraq: It was meant to bind U.S. protection to 
Georgia. But this, too, was wishful think-
ing. The implication that U.S. forces, 
had they not been tied down in 
Iraq, would have been deployed 
to fight Russia in Georgia was 
mistaken. There was simply 
no way to get enough of the 
militarily appropriate forces 
to Georgia fast enough to 
make a difference, especially Mikheil Saakashvili
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in a situation where the Georgians refused to 
reveal their intentions beforehand.
The Iraq war probably also played a role in 
Russian calculations, as did Washington’s Ko-
sovo policy. Protestations by the United States 
that Russia’s invasion of Georgia was “unaccept-
able”, while accurate in some abstract sense, rang 
hollow in the ears of many for whom the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq was similarly unacceptable and 
“illegal.” John McCain’s assertion that “in the 
21st century, nations do not invade other nations” 
sounded like the height of absurdity. Whatever 
the influence on Russian thinking, the fallout 
from Iraq undermined U.S. attempts to commu-
nicate a fundamental reality of the war: Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia was unacceptable according 
to any notion of international sovereignty or law. 
What the War Changed
However the war happened, it happened, and things are no longer as they were. The 
war changed political realities for Georgia and 
the former Soviet Union generally, and it raised 
additional challenges for the United States. 
Understanding how the political environment 
has changed will be essential for crafting sound 
policy in the Obama Administration. It won’t 
be easy even with the best of intentions, for the 
new political environment is complex and will 
likely push the United States in several different 
directions.
Russia’s actions in Georgia reverberated 
throughout the region and far beyond. It is no 
coincidence that the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine joined Geor-
gia’s President at a rally in Tbilisi last August. 
For these countries, a resurgent, confident and 
bellicose Russia is frightening. While it is un-
likely that Russia will try to provoke a similar 
war with them, it is all but certain that Russia 
will seek a larger role in their politics and try to 
push their leaders closer to Russia. 
For the United States, the war means that 
our fearful allies in Eastern Europe may look to 
us for more help than we deem it wise to pro-
vide. We clearly must balance support to East 
European countries against the prospects of 
repairing the U.S.-Russia relationship. So far, 
the latter has garnered more attention, judging 
from talk of pushing the “reset button.” That 
fact does not comfort senior decision-makers in 
Warsaw or Riga. 
Meanwhile, it remains unclear how the 
Obama Administration’s pro-Georgian policy, 
which is so far essentially unaltered from that of 
the Bush Administration, squares with improv-
ing U.S.-Russia relations or solving the problems 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s recogni-
tion of their independence has little legal signifi-
cance: Only one other state, Nicaragua (as well 
as Hamas and Hizballah), has followed Russia’s 
lead in recognizing them. However, it provides 
a pretext for Russia to increase its military pres-
ence in those regions, further integrate them into 
Russia, and make the division between those re-
gions and Georgia even sharper. Any attempt to 
resolve the status of Abkhazia and South Os-
setia thus must now begin at a more difficult 
starting point. Even advocating a temporary 
international administration of these regions 
requires challenging Russia and asking them to 
give something up. There was a time when the 
prospect of a more democratic and federally or-
ganized Georgia held out hope for a solution—
the kind of non-chauvinistic Georgian state in 
which those not of Georgian ethnicity could feel 
at home. That hope, too, has receded with the 
growing bitterness caused by the war.
The war, however, did not change every-
thing, and it certainly did not touch off a “new 
Cold War.” It was strange that fears of a new 
Cold War became one of the dominant media 
narratives in the United States during the first 
few weeks after the war began. Those who talk-
ed about a new Cold War apparently had very 
dim memories of the old one. What ideological 
threat did Russia pose to the West, as Soviet 
Communism once did? What economic dyna-
mism were they afraid of? After 1991, what vital 
American interest did Russia threaten in a man-
ner akin to Khrushchev’s promise to “bury” us? 
The Soviet use of force in Central Europe dur-
ing the Cold War—in East Germany, Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia—was fraught be-
cause of the global stakes to which it was linked 
in a tight bipolar world. To see the Russian use 
of force against Georgia, as thuggish as it was, 
through a Cold War lens is absurd.
Nonetheless, Russian aggression in Geor-
gia remains a serious issue, one that should not 
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be ignored. But it is not worth starting a new, 
long-term, global conflict with Russia to resolve 
or rectify it, particularly if the first casualty of 
such a conflict is the coherence of NATO. The 
Obama Administration needs to sort out what 
it wants and come to some sober understanding 
of what it will have to trade to get it. It cannot 
have a policy marked by full-throated democra-
tization rhetoric, NATO expansion and unre-
constructed pro-Georgian, pro-Ukrainian poli-
cies and still expect to keep NATO politically 
coherent, much less secure Russian cooperation 
on a range of non-trivial issues. On the other 
hand, it cannot create a kinder, gentler Russia 
simply by throwing old friends and old virtues 
overboard. Russia’s anti-liberal, imperial and 
frankly nefarious intentions in its near abroad 
are real, as are its ongoing efforts to destabi-
lize Georgia. Its behavior flows from historical 
predicates and political proclivities that cannot 
change quickly or easily. 
What we need, then, is a more sober assess-
ment of the ability of and cost for the United 
States to influence political outcomes in the re-
gion, as well as a clear understanding that Rus-
sian interests cannot be ignored without peril. 
The United States cannot determine its strat-
egy toward Russia in isolation from the task 
of building consensus with its European allies. 
American policymakers have sometimes given 
in to the temptation to belittle European views 
as feckless or intellectually fallow. But as satis-
fying as that may have felt, it has only helped 
Russia by making it more difficult for the Unit-
ed States and Europe to act together. 
Clearly, the Obama Administration has in-
herited a problem: U.S. goals are undercut by 
the scant availability of U.S. power (defined as 
the ability to translate U.S. assets into influence 
over outcomes). That is what the war in Georgia 
really showed. Since it is most unlikely that the 
United States will return to a position of com-
parative dominance in Eurasia anytime soon, 
we must either curtail our goals, which could 
be dangerous and counterproductive, or devise 
other ways to achieve them. That will mean 
learning all over again how to think strategi-
cally, how to plan, how to genuinely coordinate 
with allies, and how to implement and monitor 
a set of policies that privilege nuance and pa-
tience over supposed moral clarity and instant 
gratification. We need a higher tolerance for 
mixed outcomes and a lot less zeal. And with-
out addressing the core issues in the triangular 
relationship between the United States, Europe 
and Russia, we will never get there. 
Gone but not forgotten: A final column of Russian soldiers departs Georgia, August 22, 2008.
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